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Abstract 
Merger and acquisition is an important way for companies to expand market share, obtain 
greater market power and set up new disciplines. Generally, people believe that merger and 
acquisition would bring benefit from the acquirer as the managers of acquirers are assumed 
make rational decisions. However, previous studies have shown that acquirers may not 
benefit from merger. Researchers conduct studies on merger performance from various 
prospective in order to explain the post merger performance of the target or acquirer. For 
example, some of them focus on the relationship between the payment method and merger 
performance. Some of them focus on the industry relevance while some may believe the 
initial share in target may affect post merger performance. In this dissertation, we are going to 
analysis the merger performance in a different way. We will use event study method to find 
out the relationship between the merger performance and the way of merger, takeover and 
tender offer.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Merger and acquisitions are popular and have important impacts due to the large amount and 
size of deal. It has influence on the stakeholders such as acquirer, target, shareholder, 
intermediary agencies and regulatory agencies. Researches in mergers and acquisitions have 
been developed for over five decade in USA and Europe. One of the most important issues in 
this area is that whether acquirer and target gain from M&A. Most of the findings on this 
issue were based on the data from twenty years ago. Therefore, in this dissertation, we are 
going to focus on the USA M&A performance. 
 
 1.1 Purpose of Study 
Past studies has found positive return for target firm shareholder while the acquirer 
VKDUHKROGHU¶VUHWXUQDUHUHPDLQXQFOHDU-DUUHOODQG3RXOVHQFRQGXFWHGDVWXG\RQ
companies involved in tender offer deal about between 1963-1986 and found out that there is 
positive return for target companies in tender offer deal.  
Bradley (1980) found that shareholders of acquirer have positive return on tender offer deal as 
well. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins examined 170 companies, which are involved in takeover 
deal, and found out that there is positive return for acquirers. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) 
examined 271 companies involved in takeover deal between 1971 and 1982 found out that 
there is negative return to acquirers. (Bruner,2002). Jensen and Ruback (1983) states that 
synergy is the major motivation for mergers and acquisitions.  
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 1.2 Terminology and Concepts 
Mergers generally refers to two companies consolidate into one company. It is a combination 
of business. The acquired firm no longer existed after the merger. Consolidation is similar to 
merger, both of the target and the acquirer firm become a part of the new firm. Acquisition 
means one company purchased and owned other company while there is no new company 
founded. A tender offer is a public offering made by acquirer to all shareholders of target 
company, which is normally a public company, about tender their stock for a specific price 
over a specific period. In a tender offer, the acquirer contacts the target shareholder directly. 
The management team may not have information or control about the deal. A takeover is the 
tUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI FRQWURO IURP RQH FRPSDQ\¶V VKDUHKROGHUV WR RWKHU FRPSDQ\ ,W FDQ EH
realized using proxy contest and privatization.  
Brealey and Myers (2004) and Gaughan (2002) divide mergers and acquisition  into three 
categories: 
1) Horizontal mergers and acquisitions 
It is the combination between two companies, which are in the same industry. For 
example, the combination of Bank of American and Merrill Lynch. The major reason 
for M&A in similar business is to obtain synergy between two companies. Besides, 
merger and acquisition is also a way to increase market power, diversify services, 
achieve economic of scale. The competition degree of a industry is increased by the 
horizontal M&A activities. Consumers will benefit from the increased competition 
according to economic theory.  
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2) Vertical mergers and acquisitions 
It is a combination of two companies, which are processing different stage of certain 
products or services within the same industry. There are two ways of vertical mergers 
and acquisitions: 1) Forward M&A. When a company buys it product distributor, in 
the direction of target consumers, it is called forward M&A. Acquirer can benefit from 
reduced marketing and delivering cost. 2) Backward M&A. When a manufacturer 
acquires its material supplier in order to reduce the production cost, it is called 
backward M&A. 
3) Conglomerate mergers and acquisitions 
It is the mergers and acquisitions between companies from unrelated industries. They 
are neither competitor nor related business partner to each other. The main reason why 
this type of mergers and acquisitions will happen is that it is an efficient way of 
allocating capital and the management team is unwilling to distribute cash to 
shareholders. Companies can enter a new emerging market using this type of 
acquisition. (Marks and Mirvis, 1998) 
4) Concentric 
The area, where the target firm is in, is where the acquirer interested to expand to, 
however unfamiliar with. The mergers and acquisitions between these companies are 
called concentric. For example, Facebook. Inc acquires Instagram. 
Other key terms in M&A literature are: 
Acquirer: A company planed to takeover another company. They are also called bidder.  
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Target: A company being acquired by the bidder.  
Announcement date: It is the day that the M&A information become public information in 
event study.  
 
1.3 Plan of Dissertation 
The remaining part of this dissertation is showed as following.  
The next chapter, Chapter 2, is the literature review. In this chapter, we are going to 
summarize past studies of mergers and acquisition area in different aspects. Chapter 3 is 
design the overview of mergers and acquisition waves in USA and Europe. The detail of data 
collection and event study method will be explained in Chapter 4. The analysis of empirical 
results of the effecW RI GLIIHUHQW W\SH RI 0	$ RQ VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK ZLOO EH VKRZHG LQ
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes our research result and shortcoming of current study. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
2. 1 Why companies choose mergers and acquisitions? 
The reason for acquiring can be divided into four categories: Value creation, managerial 
self-interest, environmental factor and firm characteristics.  
 11 
2.1.1 Value creation. 
2.1.1.1 Market power.  
It may be considered as an attempt to extract more value from customers. Financial literature 
ZDV WKH ILUVW WR VWXG\ WKH PDUNHW SRZHU K\SRWKHVLVE\ H[DPLQLQJ ULYDO ILUPV¶ VWRFN SULFH
reaction to horizontal mergers. Some scholar believes that there is no supporting evidence for 
market power as an acquisition antecendent. (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983) Some economist 
argued that, as the rivals studied were larger firms with multiproduct, only a small percentage 
of their revenue were influenced by the market and that the sample period examined has 
highly restricted antitrust regulation. Prager (1992) conducted a study on market power 
hypothesis using the same methodology on a period with antitrust laws and diversified firms. 
He found that the share price of the rivals of railroad industry increased in the announcement 
week. This evidence supports for market power hypothesis.(Prager,1992) .LP DQG 6LQJDO¶V
(1993) study shows that in 1980s airline mergers, the merging firms increased their price on 
their route while other companies that is not effected by the merger, remain the same. 
Therefore, there is some evidence stands for market power as an acquisition motive.  
2.1.1.2 Efficiency 
Economists also conduct studies on whether acquisitions are motivated by the desire to reduce 
cost. Banerjee and Eckard (1998) found that the market drive up horizontal mergers during 
the first merger wave. Moreover, scholars found that mergers can improve long-term plant 
productivity (McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995) and public accounting service delivery (Banker, 
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Chang, & Cunningham, 2003). However, all evidence is not very straightforward. Klein (2001) 
found that the if a conglomerate company is in a late period, the diversification is discounted. 
However, contrary to prior work implying inefficiency in 1960s conglomeration (e.g., P. 
Berger & Ofek, 1995; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992), Klein reported a 
premium for late-1960s acquisitions, supporting the efficiency motive for unrelated 
acquisitions during early yet not later periods. 
2.1.1.3 Resource reallocation 
Horizontal acquisitions normally led to signify resource reallocation between acquirers and 
WDUJHW &DSURQ'XVVDXJHDQG0LWFKHOO.LQJ6ORWHJUDDIDQG.HVQHU¶VVWXG\
shows that the abnormal return of acquirer is influenced by the degree of acquirer and target 
firm resource complementarity. Karim and Mitchell (2000) state that the resource of acquirers 
has greater changes than those non-acquirers. Moreover, merger may be a way of innovation. 
Puranam and 6ULNDQWK  VKRZV WKDW WKH DFTXLUHUV FDQ DEVRUE WKH WDUJHW FRPSDQ\¶V
innovation resource by either integrating those resources with them or leverage the innovative 
ability of the firm as an independent unit. This result is in consistent with Lubatkin, Schulze, 
0DLQNDUDQG&RWWHULOO¶V UHVHDUFK WKDWPDUNHWSRVLWLRQDQGUHVRXUFHVRIILUPLQYROYHG
M&A deal effect the future product market performance.  
2.1.1.4 Market discipline 
Research in finance indicates that the acquisitions can be used to discipline the ineffective 
managers in order to enhance the company value. Agency theorists believed that acquisitions 
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could protect shareholder from poor management. (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). 
$JUDZDODQG:DONLQJ¶VUHVHDUFKVKRZVWKDWWKHFRmpensation of the of target company 
manager who received overpaid compensation before the merger is reduced after the deal is 
completed. Their research implies an market discipline hypothesis assumptions that 
companies with poor corporate governance will lead to low market value and will be taken 
over by higher value acquirers. However, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) states that 
firms with similar value will tend to merger with each other. Wang and Zajac (2007) found 
that firms with similar resources prefHUDQDFTXLVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDQDOOLDQFHµ 
2.1.2 Managerial Self-interest (value destruction) 
2.1.2.1 Compensations 
Researcher has prove that there is important linked between compensation, ownership and 
acquisitive behavior. Agrawal and Walkling (1994) shows that industries with higher CEO 
compensation normally more interested in active acquisition. The stock option of acquiring 
CEO (Sanders, 2001) and director (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2007) has a positive 
relationship with mergers and acquisition activities. The compensation of the CEOs of 
acquirers normally increased after the acquisition, Moreover, managing large firms can 
increase CEO discretion and power, therefore it can protect manager and reduced the 
employment risk. (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; 
Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). In general, acquisitions may be too attractive to CEOs than it 
should be.  
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2.1.2.2 Managerial hubris  
Past studies have shown that managerial confidence may also increase merger behavior. Roll 
(1986) was the first to introduce the CEO hubris, over self-confidence, as acquisition motive. 
+D\ZDUGDQG+DPEULFN¶VUHVHDUFKLVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKLVVWXG\WKH\IRXQGRXWWKDW
&(2¶V RYHU FRQILGHQFH LQFUHDVHV DFTXLVLWLRQ SUHPLXPV RQ WKH other hand deceased 
acquisition performance. Overconfident CEOs will overestimate their ability to generate 
returns. (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) 
2.1.2.3 Target defense tactics 
6RPH DUJXH WKDW WKLV WDFWLF LV XVHG WR SURWHFW PDQDJHUV¶ EHQHILW DW WKH FRVW RI shareholder 
wealth. Field and Karpoff (2002) found that the strategies used by IPO managers ahs negative 
relationship with the possibility of subsequent acquisition. However, Bates and Lemmon 
(2003) states that target payable fee led to higher deal completion rates and greater takeover 
premiums. They indicate that homogeneous effect does not exist in defense tactics. The 
illiquid stock owned by target CEOs has a positive relationship with the possibility of being 
acquired. Cai and Vijh (2007) 
2.1.3 Environment Factors 
2.1.3.1 Environmental uncertainty and regulation 
Researchers have being trying to find out the relationship between environment and strategy 
PRWLYDWHGDFTXLVLWLRQEHKDYLRU)ROWD¶V UHVHDUFKKDVVKRZQWKDWDOWKRXJKXQFHUWDLQW\
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of environment can increase the possibility of collaboration over acquisition, it also increase 
the possibility of acquisition over licensing agreements. (Schilling & Steensma, 2002) Highly 
diversified companies prefer to perform acquisition in stable environment while less 
diversified companies do it the other way round. (Bergh and Lawsless, 1998) Some researcher 
find out that external governance structure may also influence acquisition possibilities. 
Matsusaka (1996) found that antitrust law did not seem to hinder acquisitions. Moreover, 
M&A activities in countries with higher accounting standard and stricter shareholder 
protecting regulations seems to be more active than those counterparts. (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004) recent work shows that due to the regulation on sin industries, companies are trying to 
gain political influence through domestic expansion in order to offset the cost of such 
regulations. (Banish, Jansen, Lewis, & Stuart, 2008). 
2.1.3.2 Imitation and resource dependence 
Pfeffer (1972) shows that firms obtain resource dependencies by absorbing firms with need 
resources. However, Finkelstein (1997) states that the strength of this connection was weaker 
than originally found. In interindustry mergers, the power imbalance between two firms is the 
obstacle to the merger although the interdependency between two firms is the key driver of 
acquisition behavior.  
2.1.3.3 Network ties 
Granovetter (1973) originally developed the network ties research. Haunschild (1993) states 
that if there were interlocking directorship between two or more than two firms, managers of 
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these firm would tend to imitate the merger activities of each other. The changes in the merger 
activities of these firms had significant positive effects on changes in focal firm acquisition 
activities. (Westphal, Seidel, and Stewart, 2001) Their research explains one of the important 
reasons RIPHUJHULVWKHPDQDJHUV¶GHVLUHWRUHDOL]HSHHULVRPRUSKLVP  
2.1.4 Firm Characteristic 
2.1.4.1. Acquisition experience  
In general, recent acquisition experience is positively related to succeeding acquisition 
possibilities, especially when there is signify performance improvement. (Haleblian, Kim, & 
Rajagopalan, 2006) However, other studies found out that he acquisition experience would 
increase the possibility of succeeding mergers of the same type (e.g. horizontal, vertical,) 
(Amburgey and Miner, 1992) while the possibility of mergers of any different types will 
decrease. (Yang and Hyland, 2006) Baum, Li and Usher (2000) companies acquired would 
tend to acquire other firm with similar organization structure and geographic location as their 
most recent mergers. Vanhavebeke, Duyster and Noorderhaven (2002) states that previous 
alliance experience increased the likelihood of one partner acquiring the other, highlighting 
the influence of experience, in general, on acquisition behavior. 
2.1.4.2 Firm strategy and position 
Firm strategy and position may have strong influence on merger activities. Companies with 
global plan have higher percentage of greenfield subsidiaries than multidomestic. Companies 
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with multidomestic strategy have a higher proportion of mergers. (Harzing, 2002) Moreover, 
the targets are confront with difficult strategic hurdles are more likely to be acquired than 
those without this kind of hurdles. (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004) 
 
2.2 Merger and Acquisition Performance 
The theoretical research mainly focuses on whether mergers and acquisition generate value, 
whom benefits from mergers and acquisitions and how mergers and acquisitions generate 
value when discussing whether mergers and acquisitions improves performance. Meeks 
(1997), Mueller (1980), Ravenscraft and Schere (1987) etc., had different results about the 
mergers and acquisition performance study. 
Regarding whether mergers and acquisition improve performance, scholars had the following 
ILQGLQJV ,Q WKH ¶V PRVW RI WKH VFKRODUV ZKR DUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKLV DUHD DUH PLFUR
economists. Their study shows that the financial income was close to zero or even negative. 
,Q WKH ¶V PLFUR-finance economists analysis this topic using even study method with 
efficient market hypothesis. 7KHLUVWXG\VKRZVWKDWVKDUHKROGHUV¶RYHUDOOZHOIDUHZDVSRVLWLYH
The shareholders of target firms have a significant positive and steady return while the 
shareholders of acquirers has a insignificant small return. (Jarrell, Gregg, and Annette Poulsen, 
1989) Salter and Weinhold (1979) classified mergers and acquisitions into relevant M&A ad 
non-relevant M&A according to correlation of their strategies. They used event study to 
compare the relevant M&A with the non-relevant M&A. their results shows that relevant 
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mergers and acquisitions generates more value the non-relevant mergers and acquisition. 
Ghosh (2001) and Linn & Switer (2001) found out that there is no significant difference 
between relevant M&A and non-relevant M&A in generating value for shareholders and 
realizing synergy. Agrawall, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) found out that non-relevant mergers 
and acquisition shows that the non-relevant M&As generates higher return than relevant 
mergers and acquisition.  
Generally, people may think that as the acquirers rationally start the merger and acquisition, 
their shareholders should be the one who benefit from the merger and acquisition deal. 
However, evidences show different results. Scholar used various methods such as event study, 
accounting research method and so on to analysis the long term performance and short term 
performance of mergers and acquisition. They generally agreed that mergers and acquisition 
brings positive over all return and generates value, but target and acquirer individually has 
different return on a M&A deal. M&A brings significant positive abnormal return and a high 
price premium for the shareholders of target companies while the share value of the acquirer 
barely change and in long term, M&A generally brings negative cumulative abnormal return 
for shareholders of acquirer. (Gao, Y.S., 2004) 
In the way of how M&A generates value, theorists and participations both agreed that mergers 
and acquisition mainly generate value through restructuring and synergy effect. Restructuring 
refers to the acquirer make profit from selling certain departments of target firm to better 
buyers. That is the M&A value mainly generated by the target firm. Synergy refers to through 
collaborating different resources, such as market data, intellectual properties, equipment etc., 
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from both sides to generate value. Buono, Bowditch and Lewis (1985) states that the 
management difference may be the reason why a merger deal can not achieve its target is that 
there is different. Case studies conducted by Callahan (1986), Lipton(1982) and Rapport 
(1982) also show that the difference in management style and working values can cause a lot 
RI SUREOHP GXULQJ LQWHJUDWLRQ 'DWWD ¶V HPSLULFDO VWXG\ VKRZV WKDW WKH GLIIHUHQFH LQ
management style has negative effect on the post-M&A performance. Haspeslagh and 
Farquhar (1987) analyzed the merger process from two divisions: the dependence of their 
strategy and the demand of organization independence. From those successful cases, they 
concluded that there are four typical process forms post-M&A integration: Absorb, symbiosis, 
protection and control. Briginshaw, Bresman and Hakanson (2000) analyzed the integrating 
process of the research and development department of three multinational Sweden 
companies. They used two divisions: task integration and human resource integration and 
found out that there are two stages of integrating process.  
The payment way has influence on the control power and the post-M&A organization 
structure. There are two major ways of payment: cash payment and stock payment. Different 
SD\PHQWPHWKRGKDVGLIIHUHQWLPSDFWRQWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶return. Eckbo (1983) believed that 
merger is a good way of tax avoidance and proposed the idea of tax synergy. In his theory, 
using stock payment can be a good way of defeUULQJWD[IRUWDUJHWFRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHKROGHUDQG
substitute for some taxes, which will benefit the shareholders of target company. Acquirer can 
increase its asset when using cash payment, it can increase the depreciation rate, and therefore 
the acquirer is willing to pay at a higher price. Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf 
 20 
(1984), Travlos (1987) and Louis (2002) agreed that management team will tends issue new 
stock to finance for new merger plan when they believe that the stock price is overvalued. 
Thus, the stock price may not be a good indicator to reflect merger information and stock 
price will decrease in long term. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) discovered that investors will 
have an impression that the stock price of acquirer is overvalued when using stock payment 
Therefore, when the deal is announced the stock price will decrease as investors has adjusted 
their expectation.  
The empirical result shows the cash payment can generate more abnormal return than stock 
payment. (Gordon and Yagil, 1981) Linn & Switzer (2001) proved that the abnormal return of 
cash payment is higher from the target company prospective. However, Louis(2002) 
concluded that the long term abnormal return of acquirer is negative when using cash 
payment. 
Some scholars believe that the merger and acquisition performance is related to the industry 
relevance of both sides. Kogut and Singh(1988) examined 203 M&A deals during 1970 and 
1978. The result shows that as for acquirer, relevance M&A generate larger value than 
non-relevant M&A. Shelton (1988) had the similar conclusion that horizontal M&A and 
relevant M&A can generate high return. Industry relevance can be divided into four segments: 
1) mixed and non-mixed 2) vertical, horizontal and mixed 3) level of overlap 4) change of 
corporate focus. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) used the level of overlapping as criteria 
and found out that industries with higher level of overlapping have better performance than 
industries with lower level of overlapping. John and Ofek (1995) and Desai & Jain (1999) 
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discovered that long-term performance is significantly positive if companies improve 
corporate focus through selling non-core assets. Ghosh (2001) and Linn & Switzer (2001) 
found out that there is no significant positive relationship between corporate focus and long 
term performance. Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) states that the long term stock price 
level of a mixed M&A is higher than non-mixed M&As. Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2002) 
shows that the difference of sample, time horizon reason, control variable and research 
method is the why the above researches have different result. Therefore, they suggest that we 
should use Herfindahl Index to measure the change in industry relevance. They empirically 
examined 204 mergers and acquisition deals during 1997 and 1996. The result shows that 
there is a signify positive relationship between long-term M&A performance and change in 
corporate focus. In their theory, within three year after the merger and acquisition, every 10% 
decease in corporate focus wiOOOHDGWRGHFUHDVHLQVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWKGHFUHDVHLQ
operating performance, 1.2% in operating cash flow and the market value will shrunk by 4%.  
Companies can be divided into two types: growth stock and value stock. There is a classic 
theory, which describes the relationship of between these two types of stock and merger 
performance, called performance extrapolation hypothesis. This theory is supported by Franks, 
Harris and Titman )DPDDQG)UHQFKµs research. It believed that the majority 
of investor and other stakeholders evaluate the merger performance according to the past 
performance. People generally used price-to-book ratio as a measurement. Firms with high 
price-to-book ratio are classified as value stock and those with low price-to-book ratio are 
classified as growth stock. This theory states that 1) growth company has higher abnormal 
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return than value company during the announcement period due to the excessive expectation. 
2) In long term, as the market will adjust the market value of the overvalued companies, 
therefore the abnormal return of value acquirer will be higher than growth acquirer. 3) The 
growth acquirer will pay more for price premium. Therefore, it believes that there is a 
negative relationship between price-to-book value and short-term performance and a positive 
relationship between price-to-book value and long term performance. In Lang, Stulz and 
:DONOLQJ ¶V WHVW WKH\ IRXQG WKDW WKH UHWXUQ RI WKH DFTXLUHU GXULQJ WKH DQQRXQFHPHQW
period is positive related to Tobin's Q ratio. Anderson and Mandelker (1993) came to the same 
conclusion using price-to-book ratio to examined long term performance of 670 merger deals 
during 1966 and 1987. Rau and Vermalen (1998) testified banking industry samples and prove 
the second and the third statement of performance extrapolation hypothesis. They states that 
the abnormal return of growth companies is -17.3% three year after the merger while the 
DEQRUPDOUHWXUQRIYDOXHFRPSDQLHVLV+RZHYHU/RXLV¶VUHVXOWVKRZVthat there 
is a positive relationship between price-to-book ratio and long term performance in banking 
industry. Excluding the banking industry, there is a insignificant result that long abnormal 
return of growth acquirer, -10.1%, is higher than value acquirer, -18.5%. 
7KHUHLVVRPHWKHRU\IRFXVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHDFTXLUHU¶VLQLWLDOVKDUHDQGPHUJHU
performance. As before the announcement date, the acquirer is the only one that has internal 
information about the merger deal. Therefore, acquirer FDQEX\WDUJHWFRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHIURP
the market and set up a toehold percentage in order to push the target stock price to the deal 
price. Therefore, acquirer can gain more and improve performance. Kyle (1985), Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1986) found that the posVLELOLW\RIVXFFHVVIXO0	$DQGWKHDFTXLUHU¶VH[SHFWHGSURILW
ZLOO LQFUHDVH LI WKH DFTXLUHU¶V LQLWLDO VKDUH LQ WKH WDUJHW ILUP LQFUHDVHV +RZHYHU Bradley 
(¶VUHVHDUFKZDVDJDLQVWWKLVUHVXOW+LVVWXG\EHOLHYHGWKDWWKHSURILWJHQHUDWHIURPWKH
initial share is no large enough to cover the merger cost and most of the acquirer do not own 
WDUJHWFRPSDQLHV¶VKDUHZKHQPHUJLQJ7KHUHDUHWZRUHDVRQV$VWKHUHLVOHJDOUHVWULFWLRQ
LW LV QR SRVVLEOH WR EX\ D ODUJH DPRXQW WDUJHW ILUP¶V VKDUH VHFUHWO\ LQ the stock market. 2) 
:KHQWKHWUDQVDFWLRQLVQRWDFWLYHLQWKHPDUNHWEX\LQJDODUJHDPRXQWRIWDUJHWFRPSDQLHV¶
stock will expose the merger information to those investors who are seeking for undervalued 
stocks. The stock price will increase to the deal price and decreases the profit. Jenning (1991) 
found that only 15% of acquirer have initial share in target firm and the average initial share 
are very low, 3%. However, in deals with multiple bidder, the average initial share increased 
to 18%. Hay, Warren and Drager (2001) states that at the beginning of bidder period, it is 
HDVLHUIRUWKHDFTXLUHUWREX\LQWDUJHWFRPSDQLHV¶VKDUHVHFUHWO\  
 
2.3 Research method Literature Review 
2.3.1 Event study 
Normally event study is a research method applied to predict the financial gains and losses 
XVLQJILQDQFLDOPDUNHWWUDQVDFWLRQGDWD6KDUPD³)RULQVWDQFHWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWRID
merger or acquisition between two banks can be analyzed to make predictions about the 
potential merger-related changes to the prLFHRIWKHVHUYLFHRUSURGXFWVXEMHFWWRWKHPHUJHU´
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(Romans Tjurins, 2011) Using event study, we can know whether the return to shareholders 
changes during the period surrounding the announcement date of a merger and acquisition 
deal. It is an dominant financial research method in the area of mergers and acquisitions 
performance research.   
Event study measures stock reaction to events. Price reaction is reflected by abnormal returns. 
Abnormal return is sometimes triggered by events, such as merger, dividend announcements, 
interest rate increases etc. It is stock returns adjusted for normal stock price and market index 
movements. Test statistics are used to identify whether to ascribe target abnormal returns to 
the event. Using event study, we need to start presume how certain event effects the value of a 
firm. The hypothesis that the value of the company has changed will be translated in the stock 
showing an abnormal return. (Romans Tjurins, 2011) The assumption that price is embedded 
with merger and acquisition information, the concept of abnormal return is the key of event 
study method.  
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) conducted a study on the relationship between merger 
reasons and long-term effect. This study includes relevant M&A data over 25 year and 
measures the value creation or destruction after mergers. Their event windows are 
surrounding the announcement date. They used three days for short period and 20 days for 
longer period. They found out that companies try to use merger as a way to create synergies, 
increase their market share and bargain power so that they can become a monopoly and set up 
new market disciplines. Their result shows that the abnormal return in longer windows period 
is 16% to 20% for target firms shareholders. During the post merger period, the combined 
 25 
ILUP¶VYDOXHLQFUHDVHGDERXWFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHPHUJHU  
Loughran and Vijh (1997) conducted a study on the relationship between the post acquisition 
returns and the payment method and acquisition type. Their samples are based on 947 M&A 
deals during 1970 and 1989. Within five year after the merger, companies merged using stock 
payment have a negative return of -25% while companies used cash payments obtained a 
significant positive excess return of 61.7%. Not all the shareholders of target companies can 
gain from mergers and acquisition.  
Frank, Harris and Titman (1991) conduct a study on the share-price performance after the 
takeover. They studied on 399 U.S. takeover cases from 1975-1984. They results shows that 
there is a 28% average return for the target firm shareholder since announcement date, while 
shareholders of acquirers have neither gains nor losses. Merger and acquisition deal using 
cash payment generate more return to target than deals using a stocks or mixture of securities. 
7KHLUUHVXOWLVLQFRQVLVWHQFHZLWK-HQVHQDQG5XEDFN¶VVWXG\WKDWWKHSRRUSRVW-merger 
performance for acquirers may due to the benchmark errors rather than the mispricing. 
Equally weighted benchmark may cause poor post merger share-price performance, however 
in their research, there is a positive post merger performance when using value weighted 
benchmark. 
2.3.2 Accounting Method  
AccountinJ VWXG\ XVHV ILQDQFLDO GDWD IURP ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV RI DFTXLUHU¶V SUH DQG SRVW
merger period to measure the change in financial performance. Tools like return on equity, 
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return on assets, leverage, liquidity and earnings per share are generally used in this method to 
identify the difference in financial performance. The research purpose of these studies is to 
find out whether mergers and acquisitions able to provide a competitive advantage to the 
acquirer. (Bruner, 2002)  
Ghosh (2001) attempt to find out whether the improvement of post merger operating 
performance is influenced by the payment method and how does mergers improve operating 
performance. His sample set includes all the M&A cases during 1981 and 1995. In order to 
find out whether mergers and acquisitions can improve operating performance, he compares 
PHUJHGFRPSDQ\¶VSUHDQGSRVWPHUJHURSHUDWLQJFDVK IORZSHUIRUPDQFH+H WRRNVXSHULRU
pre-acquisition performance, size and firm into account in order to have a surefire benchmark 
and avoid bias in the regression analysis. In his study, there is no evidence supporting that 
operating cash flow performance improves during the post acquisition period. However, 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) have an opposite result that there is a better cash flow 
performance after acquisition. In his study, he concludes that cash payment was better than 
the stock payment as it utilized the asset and provide better gain on wealth for both sides. A 
higher sale is the major reason for performance improvement. Dickerson, Gibson and 
7VDNDORWRV¶VVWXG\WULHGWRILQGRXWWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQSHUIRUPDQFHRIFRPSDQ\DIWHUWKH
M&A and the changes in return. They examined 2491 firms, which took part in M&A in UK 
between 1948-1997. Their result LV LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK*KRVK¶V UHVXOW LPSO\LQJ WKDW
DFTXLVLWLRQGLGQRW LPSURYH WKHDFTXLUHU¶VSURILWDELOLW\0RUHRYHU LWKDVQHJDWLYH LPSDFWRQ
the profitability few years after the M&A. a company is more likely to have a better 
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performance driven by the internal growth rather than the growth brought by mergers and 
acquisition. Berger and Ofek (1995) estimate the diversification effect on firm value. They 
impute individual values for difference business segments. Their research shows that the 
advantages, such as improved debt capacity, lower taxes, operating efficiency and synergy, 
realized at cost of transforming resources from segments with better performance to poor 
segments. Poor investment and negative net present value may be a result of diversification. 
Their result indicates that diversification reduced firm value. There is a average of value loss, 
13%~15% over the 1986~1991 period among firms with any sizes. The loss is mitigated if the 
diversification is in related industries. Furthermore, they conclude that if the acquirer can 
have proper strategy on overinvestment and cross-subsidization, diversification can generate a 
small benefit in the form of increased debt capacity and tax shield. (Berger and Ofek, 1995) 
Mueller (1980) examined merger and acquisition deals in USA and six European countries in 
order to find out the difference in their performance and profitability against three 
benchmarks, equity, asset and sales. The research shows that acquirers grow faster than their 
competitors. The main finding of this research is that there is a slight difference in returns 
between the acquirer and their competitors. Mergers generate a little improvement in 
performance and mergers generate small gains.  
2.3.3 Clinical study  
Clinical study is a inductive research method. Clinical study refers to use field interview with 
management team of the firm and observers with in depth understanding of related firm or 
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industry. It focuses on small samples in great depth. Scholars can have new insights by delve 
into detail and the undisclosed facts about a deal. It is good for finding new patterns. However, 
there are short shortcomings with this method. The results are not representative due to the 
small amount of sample and we are not able to conduct hypothesis testing. (Bruner, 2002)  
Kaplan, Mitchell and Wruck (1997) examined the relationship between acquisition and 
company value. They try to find out if M&A generate or destroy value. They drilled into two 
merger and acquisition deals Cooper industry and Premark was individually involved and 
observed the market reaction to regarding to the deals. One of the deals has incremental effect 
on share value, while the other one decreases share value. They concluded that neither of the 
deals creates value, as there was not enough information about the target company and the 
application of inappropriate organizational designs on the target. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Merger Wave Overview 
The phenomenon that the merger activities burst out in a certain period is called merger wave. 
This description is not precise enough to describe a merger wave, but there is no widely 
accepted accurate definition or exact measurement of wave. Some researchers are focusing on 
the recognition and measurement of mergers and acquisition waves. In this dissertation, we 
are going to use direct observation to identify the burst on the mergers and acquisition. 
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3.1 The first wave (1983 to 1904) 
This wave happened in the period of economic expansion of United States, followed with ten 
years of economic stagnation. The feature of this merger wave is that most of the mergers are 
horizontal mergers performed by the giant companies. They are called horizontal 
consolidation at that time. The majority of merger deals are happened in steel, telephone, oil, 
mining, railway and other infrastructure and transportation giants. The merger purpose during 
this period was for monopoly. The publishing of the antitrust law, which is against the 
monopolies, and the outbreak of World War I ended this wave. 
 
3.2 The second wave (1919 to 1929) 
The second merger wave was a result of he significant economic growth and stock market 
boom. This wave was occurred in the United States as well. There is significant increase of 
vertical merger in this wave. The major automobile manufacturers are created during this 
period. Take Ford as an example. Ford was integrated from steel mills, railroads companies 
iron and coal companies. The main merger purpose of this wave is for oligopolistic performed 
by the larger companies. The stock market crash in 1929 and the Great Depression terminate 
the second wave. 
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3.3 The third wave (1955 to 1969-1973) 
The idea of conglomeration hold by management team of US companies led to this wave. The 
size of all mergers is relatively small. Those relatively large mergers are unrelated mergers 
with the idea of achieving growth through diversification. But these companies failed to 
benefit from diversification under the influence of crashed conglomerate stocks. IT&T, LTV, 
Teledyne and Litton were created during this period.  
As UK has similar company structure, feature and regulations as the United States, its 
mergers and acquisition activity history is much longer than any other European countries. 
The UK M&A history started from 1960s. In this wave, it is mainly horizontal mergers and 
some conglomerate mergers in the latter year, which is different from USA mergers and 
acquisitions movements in the same time. This starting of M&A activities have trigged 
mergers and acquisition movements in Europe in someway. 
 
3.4 The Fourth wave (1974-1980 to 1989) 
This wave is known as takeover wave. In this wave, many financial tools and techniques, 
such as junk bond, hostile takeover, leverage buyouts etc., were developed. Not only 
acquisitions occur in this wave, but also the divestitures. US companies acquire companies, 
which can expand their advantage in competition, and get rid of those companies that would 
limit their advantages. This takeover wave stems from the first hostile bid made by Morgan 
Stanley, representing Inco, to takeover ESB. The successful of this hostile bid started the 
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ZDYHWKDWPDMRULQYHVWPHQWEDQNVPDNHELGRQWKHLUFOLHQWV¶EHKDOI'XULQJWKLVSHULRGLWZDV
the time that corporate raiders, such as Boone Pickens, uses two-tier, front-end-loaded, 
boot-strap, bust-up, junk bond, hostile tender offers to acquire companies until the poison pill 
was introduced in the 1980s. However, the merger and acquisition activities were still 
increasing in the latter 1980s and paused for only a few months due to the stock market crash 
in October 1987. Between 1989 to 1990, due to the $25 billion RJR Nabisco leverage buyout 
and the junk bond market crash, along with the collapse of saving and loan bank and serious 
loan portfolio and capital problems of the commercial banks, this merger wave ended. (Martin 
Lipton, 2006)  
UK has the same characteristic as the United States and Europe was affected by the moves of 
above two countries. Companies in Europe started to use cross-border horizontal mergers to 
prepare for the Common market during the latter half of 1908s. Some finding shows that 
since 1984 mergers and acquisitions activities have increased by small size and volume in 
Europe.  
3.5 The fifth wave (1993 to 2000) 
This wave was originated from USA. With the assumption that size does matter, companies 
with unprecedented size were created. The high stock price performance continuously pushes 
companies to conduct deals in order to maintain their competition advantages. Another main 
feature is that companies have global view of competition, which motivates them to create 
distinguished competitive advantages through cross border takeovers. Companies must be big 
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to compete. This led to once-unthinkable combinations, such as such as the mergers of 
Citibank and Travelers, Chrysler and Daimler Benz, Exxon and Mobil, Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas, AOL and Time Warner, and Vodafone and Mannesmann. (Martin Lipton, 
2006) The worldwide volume of mergers increased steadily form $342 billions of deals in 
1992 to $3.3 trillion in 2000. Nine of the ten largest deals in history all took place between 
1998 and 2000. Most of the deals in 1990 were strategic mergers and used stock payment. 
Most of the acquirers states that they want a equal deal with the target at the beginning, 
however, in fact, it turn out unequal in the end. The first quarter of 2000 started with a 
record-setting $165 billion merger deal between AOL and Time Warner. However, the TMT 
sector started to slow down after a five-year rapid development. At the end of first quarter of 
2000, the Internet and telecom stocks started to crash due to the earning and financing 
problems. The bubble burst while the merger number and volume of 2000 exceed 1999 by a 
small amount. The NASDAQ index had a dramatic drop by more than 50% compared with its 
peak. Most of the TMT stocks decreased by more than 50%, some even as much as 98%. The 
junk bond market barely exists. Banks are stricter when doing lending screening. The market 
does not welcome merger announcements. As there are 50% less merger activities in 2001 
than 2000, the fifth merger wave ended 
The global competition vision not only affects US companies but also European companies. 
Because of increasing number of deal completed between European countries and the stability 
transatlantic deals, the number and the size of the deals has increased by a huge amount in 
Europe. Moreover, with the introduction of euro currency, currency risk and home bias 
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investment has reduced. Some scholars believed the fifth merger wave is the first international 
merger wave due to the rapid growing of cross-border takeover. 
 
3.6 The sixth wave (2002 to 2010) 
Martin Lipton (2006) believes that there are new merger activities as the merger and 
acquisition volume has increased from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $3.4 billion by the end of 2006. 
He states that the government support (e.g. France, Italy and Russia), rise in commodity 
prices, low-interest financing, hedge fund and the growth of private equity funds are the most 
important characteristics of this wave. As the economic environment and management 
strategy is stable over this period, the number of hostile takeover, which can have immediate 
acquisitions other than changing capital market structure slowly, has increased rapidly.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology and Data Collection 
4.1 Methodology 
In this study, we are planning to use event study as research method.  
It is useful to briefly discuss the structure of an event study. From Campbell, Lo and 
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MacKinley (1997), we can know that there are seven key steps for a typical event study. 
Firstly, before starting an event study, we need to define the event of interest the to event and 
identify the event period and estimate period. This step is called event definition. Event period 
generally refers to the period surrounding the announcement date. Stock prices of within this 
period will be collected, including the announcement date. It is common to define the event 
window to be larger than the specified period of interest and the period of interest need to be 
included with in the event period so that the effect on the stock price before and after the 
announcement date is taken in to account. For instance, in a merger announcement case, there 
might be rumor on the market about the merger before the announcement date and one can 
figure out this probability by calculating the pre-event returns. In this study, we construct the 
event window as 90 days before and 30 days after the announcement date, as Brown and 
Warner (1985) and MacKinley (1997) suggested. Estimation period refers to a certain period 
before the event period. It is used as a normal period that shows how the stock price should 
have behave without certain event. Market indexes are used as a reference in general 
circumstance.  
The second step is called selection criteria. After setting the event period and defining the 
event, we need to choose a certain criteria for choosing our targets or samples. The criteria 
may include data availability, such as listing on the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or may restrict 
to specified company. Moreover, it is necessary to set up some sample characteristics, such as 
deal size, deal type, market capitalization, time period etc. it should be clarify that potential 
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bias may be embedded with the sample.  
Thirdly, define the normal and abnormal returns. The measure of abnormal return should be 
clearly defined so that we will be able to test for the impact of an event. Extract the normal 
return of the firm over the estimate window from the actual ex-post return of the security over 
the event window. The normal return is the return of stock during the estimation period. For 
firm X and event date T the abnormal return is  ܣܴ௫௧ ൌ ܴ௫௧ െ ܴԢ௫௧  
Where  
ARxt is the abnormal return 
Rxt is the actual return of time period t 
5¶xt is the normal return for estimate period  
 
Peterson (1989) suggests that there are three types of techniques used to estimate normal 
return during the estimation period.  
The fourth step is estimation procedure. Normally, the event itself should not be taken into 
account as it may influence the parameters of normal performance model. In this study, we 
use an estimation window of 30 days ending ninety trading days prior to the first event being 
examined (usually the announcement date for mergers or reference date for market inquiries). 
Thus, the estimation window is (-120, -90). Note that non-trading days must be removed from 
the data to avoid distorting the results, especially around the event date itself. (Lucy Beverley, 
2007) 
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The fifth step is testing procedure. We need to define a testing framework for any abnormal 
return calculated. This framework should include the definition of the null hypothesis and 
WHFKQLTXHVIRUDGGLQJXSWKHUHVXOWVRYHUFHUWDLQSHULRG³)RUH[DPSOHDQHTXDOO\ZHLJKWHGRU
value-weighted portfolio may be constructed to test the effect of an event on several firms. We 
define the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as the sum of the abnormal returns for each day 
LQWKHHYHQWZLQGRZ´ (Lucy Beverley, 2007) ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ෍ܣܴ௜௧ 
The null hypothesis of the certain event is that there is no impact on the mean or variance of 
returns. Therefore, the expectation of abnormal return is zero. We can draw a t-test,  ݐ ൌ ܥܣܴூȀߪூȀξ݊ 
Where ߪூ is the standard error of the distribution 
n is the number of days in the event window 
Moreover, we need to find out the whether an event study test will correctly reject the null 
hypothesis, so that we are able to draw a inferences from an event study. In order to do so, we 
QHHGWRH[DPLQHWKHµSRZHU¶RIWKHVWDWLVWLFDOWHVWLQTXHVWLRQ7KHUHIRUHWKHsignificant level 
can be set at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
The sixth step is present result and analysis 
The last step is interpret results and draw conclusions. At this stage, we might need to choose 
between conflicting results. 
There are two advantages for event study as Bruner (2002) discussed about in his study. 
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Firstly, unlike other methods, which focus on financial ratios, manager strategies and 
economic gains, event study measures the value generated for investor directly. Secondly, it is 
a measure of predicting the value created in the future. Because, the stock price is the present 
value of future dividend 
However, it has two disadvantages as well. Firstly, it has unreasonable assumptions. It 
assumed that the stock market is a efficient market, in which all the information even insider 
information are reflected by the stock price instantly. The investors in this market are all 
rational investors and there are unrestricted arbitrage chances. These assumptions are believed 
to be unnecessary for on average and over time. Secondly, in reality, there might be more than 
one event happened in one day or over a certain period. Therefore, the abnormal return of the 
company of certain event might be a result of a mixture of events. This can skew the returns 
for sample companies at certain events. The abnormal return may not be the best measure to 
reflect influence of the event solely.  
 
4.2 Data Collection 
In the study, samples we are planning to use include 100 acquisitions made by NYSE-listed 
companies during the period of 1st January 2002 and 31st December 2012. This sample 
includes a comprehensive set of target firm and acquirer of takeover merger and target firm 
and acquirer of tender offer merger, which fit in the following criteria: 
1) The target firm was listed on NYSE. 
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2) The acquirer firm was listed on NYSE. 
3) The share price information of the acquirer and target firm is available from Chicago 
Research in Security Price (CRSP) data.  
4) The announcement date of the merger deal can be found on Bloomberg terminal. 
5) The payment methods should be cash, stock or a combination of cash and stock. 
6) The market index we used is S&P index. 
We used the criteria mentioned above on Bloomberg; we take the 100 largest takeover merger 
cases and 100 largest tender offer merger cases.  
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
5.1 Takeover Acquirer 
Chart 1 describes the abnormal return, cumulative abnormal return, t-value and confidence 
level of the acquirer sample in a takeover deal. The event window we used in this sample is 
day -20 to day 20, 41 trading days in total. The confidence level is at 95% during the vent 
period. We are going to divide the event window into three periods: pre-announcement period, 
event date, and post announcement period. During the post-announcement period, day -10 
(ARt=0.43%, |t|=1.98) and day-6  (ARt=-0.27%, |t|=1.97) has abnormal return. The 
confidence level of these days is 95% and the absolute t-value is greater than 1.96, the 
hypothesis that abnormal return=0 is rejected. Therefore, there is evidence that there is 
abnormal return during these days. This shows that there could be information leakage before 
takeover announcement. 
For the announcement date, day 0, the abnormal return is -2.07% with a absolute t-value of 
3.48, which is significantly rejected the hypothesis that abnormal return is zero. During the 
post-announcement period, day 2 (ARt=-0.53%, |t|=2.54), day 10 (ARt=0.19%, |t|=1.98) and 
day 10 (ARt=-0.46%, |t|=2.02), this shows the hypothesis is rejected.  
Chart 1: Abnormal return, cumulative return, t-value and confidence level of 
Acquirers in Takeover 
Event 
Window 
Abnormal Return 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
t-value 
Confidence 
level 
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-20 0.24% 0.24% 1.41 - 
-19 0.17% 0.41% 1.17 - 
-18 -0.11% 0.31% -0.63 - 
-17 -0.01% 0.30% -0.06 - 
-16 0.18% 0.47% 1.06 - 
-15 0.16% 0.63% 1.05 - 
-14 -0.15% 0.48% -0.78 - 
-13 -0.11% 0.37% -0.61 - 
-12 0.04% 0.41% 0.24 - 
-11 -0.19% 0.22% -1.1 - 
-10 0.43% 0.65% 1.98 95% 
-9 -0.01% 0.64% -0.04 - 
-8 0.01% 0.65% 0.07 - 
-7 -0.06% 0.59% -0.34 - 
-6 -0.27% 0.32% -1.97 95% 
-5 -0.16% 0.16% -0.76 - 
-4 -0.18% -0.02% -1.07 - 
-3 0.10% 0.09% 0.61 - 
-2 -0.06% 0.03% -0.43 - 
-1 0.14% 0.17% 0.91 - 
0 -2.07% -1.90% -3.48 95% 
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1 0.50% -2.60% 1.68 - 
2 -0.53% -3.11% -2.54 95% 
3 0.21% -2.58% 0.97 - 
4 0.20% -2.79% 0.74 - 
5 0.14% -2.99% 0.69 - 
6 -0.06% -3.13% -0.28 - 
7 0.26% -3.07% 1.23 - 
8 0.00% -3.32% 0.01 - 
9 -0.07% -3.33% -0.38 - 
10 -0.19% -3.26% -1.99 95% 
11 -0.07% -3.07% -0.36 - 
12 0.24% -3.00% 1.03 - 
13 -0.03% -3.24% -0.15 - 
14 0.06% -3.21% 0.32 - 
15 -0.05% -3.28% -0.27 - 
16 -0.46% -3.23% -2.02 95% 
17 -0.01% -2.77% -0.03 - 
18 -0.12% -2.76% -0.74 - 
19 -0.47% -2.64% -1.99 95% 
20 -0.27% -2.17% -0.89 - 
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Figure 1 shows the overall trend for target firm cumulative abnormal return in a takeover deal 
during the event window, day -20 to day 20. The overall trend can be divided into three 
patterns. From day -20 to -1, the cumulative abnormal return is fluctuating above zero. It 
started to decrease from day -7 to -1 and stays around zero. From day 0 to day 2, the 
cumulative abnormal return drop dramatically to -3.11% and remained low after day 3. From 
the fact that abnormal return remain above zero before announcement date and dropped below 
zero after announcement we can know in a takeover deal can have a negative effect on 
shareholdeUV¶ZHDOWKRIWDUJHWILUP 
 
 
5.2 Takeover Target 
Chart 3 describes the event window, abnormal return, cumulative abnormal return, t-value and 
confidence level of target firm in takeover deal. The event window is defined as day -20 to 20, 
41 trading days. The confidence level is 95%. During the post-announcement period, day -19 
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(ARt=-1.22%, |t|=2.95), day -17 (ARt=-0.52%, |t|=3.55), day -16 (ARt=0.90%, |t|=3.07), day 
-15 (ARt=-2.3%, |t|=3.75), day -13 (ARt=1.03%, |t|=5.39), day -11 (ARt=-0.99%, |t|=2.2), day 
-10 (ARt=-1.44%, |t|=3.17) and day -4 (ARt=-1.07%, |t|=2.21) have abnormal return. And the 
absolute t-value is greater than 1.96, the hypothesis is rejected, there it is significant abnormal 
return before announcement date.  
On the announcement date, the abnormal return is 0.06% and the t-value is 2.25, meaning that 
the abnormal return is insignificant on announcement date. The hypothesis that there is no 
abnormal return exists is rejected.  
During the post announcement date, day 1 (ARt=-0.13%, |t|=2.92), day 4 (ARt=-0.79%, 
|t|=2.95), day 16 (ARt=1.55%, |t|=2.18), day 17 (ARt=-1.5%, |t|=2.04) and day 19 
(ARt=-2.34%, |t|=2.27) have abnormal return with absolute t-value greater than 1.96, 
indicating that there are significant abnormal return on these days.  
Chart 2: Abnormal return, cumulative return, t-value and confidence level of Targets 
in Takeover 
Event 
Window 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return t-Value Confidence Level 
-20 -0.0050607 -0.0050607 -1.52 - 
-19 -0.0121808 -0.0172415 -2.95 95% 
-18 -0.0106674 -0.0279088 -1.22 - 
-17 -0.0051977 -0.0331066 -3.55 95% 
-16 0.0089633 -0.0241432 3.07 95% 
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-15 -0.0230475 -0.0471907 -3.75 95% 
-14 0.0098026 -0.0373881 0.52 - 
-13 0.010293 -0.0270951 5.39 95% 
-12 0.0037666 -0.0233285 0.19 - 
-11 -0.0099475 -0.033276 -2.2 95% 
-10 -0.0144056 -0.0476816 -3.17 95% 
-9 0.0044587 -0.0432229 0.48 - 
-8 0.0089565 -0.0342664 0.54 - 
-7 -0.0050393 -0.0393057 -0.49 - 
-6 -0.0230084 -0.0623141 -1.58 - 
-5 0.042026 -0.0202881 1 - 
-4 -0.0106565 -0.0309446 -2.21 95% 
-3 -0.0011884 -0.032133 -0.65 - 
-2 -0.0095364 -0.0416694 -1.19 - 
-1 -0.001312 -0.0429814 -0.3 - 
0 0.000587 -0.0423944 2.25 95% 
1 -0.0092564 0.0808032 -2.92 - 
2 -0.0008241 0.0799791 -0.26 - 
3 -0.0006663 0.0793128 -0.1 - 
4 -0.007867 0.0714458 -2.95 95% 
5 0.0066371 0.0780829 0.73 - 
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6 -0.0026405 0.0754423 -0.71 - 
7 -0.0072334 0.0682089 -0.83 - 
8 0.0144943 0.0827033 1.66 - 
9 0.002618 0.139982 0.49 - 
10 -0.0062756 0.1337064 -1.46 - 
11 0.0009781 0.1346845 0.16 - 
12 -0.0021146 0.1325699 -0.38 - 
13 0.0077705 0.1403404 1 - 
14 0.051124 0.1454528 0.42 - 
15 0.006599 0.1520517 0.88 - 
16 0.0155279 0.1675796 2.18 95% 
17 -0.0154554 0.1521242 -2.04 95% 
18 0.0066334 0.1587576 0.42 - 
19 -0.0233872 0.1353704 -2.27 95% 
20 -0.0131344 0.122236 -1.92 - 
 
)LJXUHVKRZVWKHRYHUDOOWUHQGRIWDUJHW¶VFXPXODWLYHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQLQWDNHRYHU7KHWUHQG
can be divided into three parts. From day -20 to 0, the cumulative abnormal return is 
fluctuating below zero. For the period between day 1 and day 8, the CAR increases 
dramatically to 8.08% on day 1 and remain stable. From day 9 to day 20, the cumulative 
abnormal return increases to 14.03% on day 9 and remain stable around 15%. There is no 
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obvious evidence that there is information leakage before announcement date. And the 
increase in abnormal return shows that the market is in favor of the takeover. 
 
 
5.3 Tender offer Acquirer 
&KDUW  GHVFULEHV WKH DFTXLUHU¶V GDLO\ DEQRUPDO UHWXUQ DQG FXPXODWLYH DYHUDJH DEQRUPDO
return in a tender offer deal. The event window in the sample is -20 to 20, 41 trading days. 
The confidence level of samples is mainly at 90% during the event period. During the 
pre-announcement period, day -19 (ARt=0.55%, |t|=3.57), day-7 (ARt=-1.34%, |t|=2.97) and 
day -5 (ARt=-0.94%, |t|=1.7) have absolute t-value greater than 1.64, therefore it is significant 
that there are abnormal return on these days. Moreover, as there are abnormal returns on day 
-5 and day -7 there could be information leakage before announcement date.  
On the announcement date, the abnormal return is 0.6% with a critical value of 1.83, 
indicating that there is abnormal return on this date.  
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During the post announcement period, day 11 (ARt=-0.98%, |t|=1.74) and day 14 (ARt=-1.5%, 
|t|=1.72), day 19 (ARt=-0.68%, |t|=1.67) and day 20 (ARt=-0.85%, |t|=2.01) has abnormal 
return. As all these days have critical value greater than .164, meaning that the null hypothesis 
is rejected, abnormal return exists.  
Chart 3: Abnormal return, cumulative return, t-value and confidence level of Acquirers 
in Tender offer 
Event Window Abnormal Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return t-Value Confidence Level 
-20 0.04% -8.79% 0.12 - 
-19 0.55% -7.94% 3.57 90% 
-18 -0.36% -7.26% -1.22 - 
-17 0.48% -6.85% 1.41 - 
-16 -0.30% -7.89% -0.83 - 
-15 0.08% -7.82% 0.72 - 
-14 -0.53% -7.05% -1.11 - 
-13 -0.03% -5.55% -0.07 - 
-12 0.00% -5.67% 0.01 - 
-11 -0.46% -5.42% -0.78 - 
-10 0.64% -4.44% 1.2 - 
-9 -0.16% -3.94% -0.53 - 
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-8 -0.35% -4.50% -0.6 - 
-7 -1.34% -4.19% -2.97 90% 
-6 -0.58% -3.85% -0.6 - 
-5 -0.94% -3.10% -1.7 90% 
-4 -0.07% -2.64% -0.19 - 
-3 0.15% -2.19% 0.51 - 
-2 0.35% -1.66% 0.89 - 
-1 -0.08% -1.66% -0.29 - 
0 0.60% -2.33% 1.83 90% 
1 -0.13% -2.93% -0.36 - 
2 0.01% -2.85% 0 - 
3 -0.52% -3.20% -0.87 - 
4 -0.45% -3.34% -0.58 - 
5 -0.46% -3.27% -1.11 - 
6 -0.75% -2.33% -1.21 - 
7 -0.34% -1.75% -0.77 - 
8 -0.31% -0.41% -1.05 - 
9 0.56% -0.05% 1.4 - 
10 -0.50% 0.11% -1.33 - 
11 -0.98% -0.53% -1.74 90% 
12 -0.25% -0.07% -0.65 - 
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13 0.12% -0.08% 0.28 - 
14 -1.50% -0.05% -1.72 90% 
15 -0.77% 0.48% -0.71 - 
16 -0.07% 0.40% -0.15 - 
17 1.05% 0.71% 0.88 - 
18 -0.41% 0.23% -0.7 - 
19 -0.68% 0.58% -1.67 90% 
20 -0.85% 0.04% -2.01 90% 
 
 
 
5.4 Tender off Target 
Chart 4 describes the target daily abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return in 
a tender offer deal. The event window in the sample is -20 to 20, 41 trading days. The 
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confidence level of samples is mainly at 90% and 95% during the event period. We are going 
to divide the event window into three periods: pre-announcement period, event date, and post 
announcement period. During the pre-announcement period, day -8 (ARt=2.8708%, |t|=1.68), 
day -6=(ARt=2.1393%%, |t|=1.78), day -5=(ARt=1.3601%, |t|=1.67, day -2=(ARt=3.8982%, 
|t|=1.66) has abnormal return. The confidence level of these days are at 90% and the absolute t 
values generated by sample are larger than 1.645. These abnormal return shows that there 
could be a leak of information about the merger deal before the announcement date. These 
positive abnormal return shows that they are optimistic about the deal. Therefore, in order to 
make profit out of the information, these people buy in target company stocks in the market, 
which increase the demand in a short period, and led to a increase in stock price before 
announcement.  
On the announcement date, day 0, ARt=2.63%% and |t|=1.92. This indicates that the 
hypothesis ARt=0 is rejected, there is evidence that there is abnormal return on this day. The 
market reaction was neutral. The market was surprised by the merger and acquisition news. 
For the post announcement period, day 4 (ARt=-2.25%, |t|=1.85) and day 13 (ARt=1.51%, 
|t|=1.99) at a confidence level of 90%. This provides supporting evidence that there is 
information leakage before the announcement. 
Another factor we are looking in to is cumulative abnormal return. By using cumulative 
DEQRUPDO UHWXUQ ZH FDQ NQRZ KRZ WKH WHQGHU RIIHU DQQRXQFHPHQW HIIHFW WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶
wealth on average. In our sample, the CAR has a significant upward trend from -20 to day 20. 
It increases from 1.70% of day -20 to 25.01% of day 20. The total cumulative abnormal return 
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from day -20 to day 0 is 15.94%. 63.74% of the CAR has been explained, this indicates that 
there could be information leakage. 
Chart 4: Abnormal return, cumulative return, t-value and confidence level of 
Target in Tender offer 
Event 
Window 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return t-value Confidence Level 
-20 1.70% 1.70% 0.44 - 
-19 -1.31% 0.40% -0.64 - 
-18 -2.55% -2.16% -1.19 - 
-17 -1.44% -3.59% -1.29 - 
-16 -1.05% -4.64% -0.88 - 
-15 -1.49% -6.13% -0.93 - 
-14 1.75% -4.38% -1.08 - 
-13 0.95% -3.43% 0.77 - 
-12 -0.37% -3.80% -0.54 - 
-11 1.24% -2.56% -0.92 - 
-10 4.00% 1.44% -1 - 
-9 0.66% 2.10% 0.79 - 
-8 2.87% 4.98% -1.68 90% 
-7 0.08% 5.05% -0.13 - 
-6 2.14% 7.19% -1.78 90% 
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-5 1.36% 8.55% 0.67 90% 
-4 0.62% 9.17% 0.32 - 
-3 0.10% 9.27% 0.09 - 
-2 3.90% 13.17% -1.55 - 
-1 0.15% 13.32% -0.14 - 
0 2.63% 15.94% -1.92 90% 
1 1.57% 17.51% 0.5 - 
2 0.12% 17.64% -0.08 - 
3 -0.56% 17.07% -0.29 - 
4 -2.25% 14.82% -1.85 90% 
5 -0.84% 13.98% -0.65 - 
6 1.79% 15.76% -1.01 - 
7 0.68% 16.44% -0.43 - 
8 -0.06% 16.39% 0.07 - 
9 -1.17% 15.21% 0.81 - 
10 -1.38% 13.84% -1.5 - 
11 -0.84% 12.99% -0.65 - 
12 1.06% 14.05% -1.06 - 
13 1.51% 15.56% -1.99 90% 
14 -0.74% 14.82% -1.31 - 
15 1.82% 16.64% -1.27 - 
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16 1.55% 18.19% -1.04 16 
17 -1.33% 16.86% -0.61 17 
18 1.86% 18.72% -1.16 18 
19 1.02% 19.75% -1.32 19 
20 1.26% 21.01% 0.84 20 
 
The graph shows that the overall trend of cumulative abnormal return of target firms in tender 
offer deal from day -20 to day +20. The CAR deceased from day -20 to day -16 and reached a 
bottom. From day -16 to day 0, the CAR increased rapidly to 15.94% from -4.64%. This 
evidence indicated that there could be information leakage before the announcement. After 
the merger was announced, the increasing speed started to slow down and return to normal.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Merger and acquisition is an important way for companies to change the current situation. 
There are various motivations for companies to engaged in mergers and acquisitions activities. 
Through mergers and acquisitions, companies could obtain market power, improve market 
efficiency, reallocating resources and set up market discipline. This can improve to company 
performance and create value. However, companies may merger with or acquirer other 
FRPSDQLHVIRUPDQDJHU¶VVHOI-interest for the following three reasons. Firstly, as 
compensation will normally increase after M&A, manager may try to conduct a merger deal 
just for the additional compensation they can have and not focus on how much the company 
would benefit from the deal. Secondly, with successful merger news, managers may be over 
confidence of themselves on handle merger between two companies and ignore the fact that 
deals with different determinant factors, they are too unique to apply to each other. 
Overconfidence CEOs will increase the acquisition premium and have a negative influence on 
the post-acquisition performance. Thirdly, manager may use target defense tactics to protect 
their own benefit at the H[SHQVHRIVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWKMoreover, environment can be an 
important factor as well. The environment uncertainty may not be a favorable environment for 
mergers and acquisitions. Network ties indicates that if companies have control right of each 
other, their mergers and acquisition activities tends to be alike. Furthermore, firm 
characteristic, strategy and position are important factor as well. managers with successful 
acquisition experience is more likely to involve in same type of acquisitions.  
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There were six merger waves in the history. The first merger wave is known as the horizontal 
merger wave. Mergers purpose during this period were mainly for monopoly. The second 
merger wave is the beginning of vertical merger wave. At that time, the main merger purpose 
of this wave is for oligopolistic performed by the larger companies. Third merger wave is 
conglomeration merger wave. It is popular for companies to merger with other companies 
from different industry so that they can diversify their income. The fourth merger wave is 
known as takeover wave. During that time many financial tools and techniques were 
introduced. The fifth merger wave was originated from USA. The most important feature of 
this wave is that many once-unthinkable deals were completed. It is the first international 
merger wave. The sixth merger wave is driven by the government support, rise in commodity 
price, low-interest financing and the rapid development of private equities. Number of hostile 
takeover increased quickly during this period.  
Scholars have different understanding and methods to measure whether create value. They 
found out that there is a positive overall return using event study. However, the return for 
acquirer is close to zero and the target shareholder has a greater and more stable return. 
Relevant merger generate greater value than irrelevant mergers.  
People would believe that the mergers and acquisition would benefit the acquirers, as they 
assume they are rational economic entities. However, researches show different result. Studies 
show that shareholders of target companies have a significant abnormal return. The stock 
value of the acquirer do not have significant changes in short term and in long term the 
cumulative abnormal return become negative.  
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Some scholars focus on the relationship between the payment method and the merger 
performance. There are two major payment methods: Stock and cash. Some study shows that 
deals using cash payment generates more abnormal return than stock payment in short term. 
However, in long term, acquirer has a zero abnormal return when using cash payment while 
stock payment generates zero abnormal return. 
Some researchers believe that the merger performance can be explained by the industry 
correlation. Deals with higher industry correlation have a better merger performance. 
However, non-relevant merger generates higher value than relevant mergers. In long term, 
there is no difference between relevant merger and non-relevant merger in generating value 
for shareholders.  
There is one classic theory that describe the relationship between growth stock, value stock 
and merger performance called performance extrapolation hypothesis. It assumes that 
companies with high price to book value is defined as value stock while companies with low 
price to book value is defined as growth stock. During the announcement period, due to the 
excessive expectations, growth stock will generate higher abnormal return than value stocks. 
In long term, the abnormal return of value stock will be higher than growth stock. Growth 
stock will pay a higher merger premium. 
6RPHWKHRULHVIRFXVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHDFTXLUHU¶VLQLWLDOVKDUHDQGPHUJHU
performance. Empirical study shows that the possibility of successful merger will increase, as 
the acquirer owns more shares in the target initially. However, some researchers found out 
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that acquirers are hard to make profit out of initial share as the strict rules on information 
disclosure.   
There are three major methods in merger performance area: event study, accounting method 
and clinical study. Event study is the dominant method in merger and acquisition area. It 
calculates the abnormal return of stock price generated by the event through comparing with 
the normal return in the estimating period. It assumes that the price is embedded with M&A 
information. Accounting method, through comparing the pre and post merger financial data 
from acquirers¶ financial statements to find out whether merger provides a competitive 
advantage. ROE, ROA, leverage ratio, liquidity and EPS are widely used. Clinical study is an 
inductive research method. It focuses on small sample in great depth using field interview 
with management team. It is good for finding new patterns but results are not representative 
due to the small sample size. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effect of tender offer and takeover 
DQQRXQFHPHQWVRQVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWKXVLQJWKHHVWLPDWHGDEQRUPDOUHWXUQDURXQGWKH
announcement date.  
By analyzing the average abnormal return in the event window, we tested the hypothesis to 
see if abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return is significantly different from zero.  
For acquirer in a takeover, the lowest abnormal return we observed is on day 0 of the event 
window with a significant t-value at 95% confidence level. Therefore, the null hypothesis is 
rejected on this day. The cumulative abnormal return lies below zero since the announcement 
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day. After the takeover, the CAR has decreased to a stage that is much lower than the 
pre-announcement period.  
For targets in a takeover, the abnormal return increased dramatically on the announcement 
date on the confidence level of 95%. The absolute t-value for that date is 2.92, which means 
the null hypothesis is rejected. The cumulative abnormal returns stayed above zero after the 
announcement date and keep increasing. This shows the market is in favor of the takeover 
announcement.  
For acquirers in tender offer, the abnormal return is 0.60% with a t-value of 1.83 on a 90% 
confidence level. This indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. The cumulative abnormal 
return was increasing before the announcement and kept increasing after a 7-day decline after 
the announcement. This shows that there might be a information leakage before the 
announcement and the insider is pessimistic about the news. 
For target in tender offer, the abnormal return is the highest on the announcement date. The 
absolute t-value is 1.92 which is lower than 1.64 at the 90% confidence level. This means the 
null hypothesis is rejected. There is abnormal return on this day. Information leakage may be 
able to explain why there is a upward movement of cumulative abnormal return before the 
announcement date. After the announcement date, market starts to absorb new, therefore the 
cumulative abnormal return started to increase slower and return to normal speed. 
From the above analysis, we can know that takeover and tender offer announcement will have 
DSRVLWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHalth of target and have a negative influence on 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWKRIDFTXLUHUZLWKLQWKHHYHQWZLQGRZ 
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